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On August 10, 2010, President Barack Obama signed the
SPEECH Act (Securing the Protection of our Enduring and
Established Constitutional Heritage). This prevents American courts
from enforcing foreign defamation judgments—in practice, mostly
British ones—unless
the defamation law applied in the foreign court’s
adjudication provided at least as much protection
for freedom of speech and press in that case as
would be provided by the First Amendment to the
Constitution of the United States and by the
constitution and law of the State in which the
1
domestic court is located.

* Assistant Professor, Hank Greenspun School of Journalism and Media Studies,
University of Nevada, Las Vegas. The author gratefully acknowledges the assistance of
Rachel Ehrenfeld, Helen Mabelis, Michael W. Macleod-Ball, Arthur Miller, Arnon Siegel,
and Drew Sullivan.
1. Pub. L. No. 111-223 (H.R. 2765), Aug. 10, 2010; 28 U.S.C. § 4102(a)(1)(A). The
law also allows enforcement even if the defamation law applied in the foreign court’s
adjudication did not provide as much protection for freedom of speech and press as the
First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States and the constitution and law of
the State. The party opposing recognition or enforcement of that foreign judgment would
have been found liable for defamation by a domestic court applying the First Amendment
to the Constitution of the United States and the constitution and law of the State in which
the domestic court is located. 28 U.S.C. § 4102(a)(1)(B). The burden is on the party
seeking enforcement to establish consistency with First Amendment standards. 28 U.S.C.
§ 4102(2). The law also bars enforcement of foreign defamation judgments (i) where the
foreign court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction did not comport with constitutional due
379
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Congress enacted the bill even though it appeared that no foreign
defamation judgment had been collected in the United States in
2
recent decades. Although plaintiffs had attempted to do so in the
past, American courts had refused to comply. Nonetheless, witnesses
testified that the very possibility that British libel judgments could be
3
enforced in the United States imposed a chilling effect on publishing.
This was enough to spur Congress to act.
The new law addresses the menace of so-called “libel tourism.”
However, another danger lurks: privacy tourism. Here, too, plaintifffriendly Britain poses the gravest threat. And here, too, although it
appears that no plaintiffs have collected foreign judgments in the
United States—or even brought any cases against American citizens
to trial—the very possibility of such litigation is creating a chill.
Before privacy tourism becomes a serious hindrance to American
media, Congress should extend the SPEECH Act to cover privacy
judgments.

I. Libel Tourism
Libel tourism, according to the Congressional Research Service, is
“the phenomenon whereby a plaintiff brings a defamation suit in a
country with plaintiff-friendly libel laws, even though the parties
might have had relatively few contacts with the chosen jurisdiction
4
prior to the suit.” Discussions of libel tourism typically begin with
5
Rachel Ehrenfeld. In 2003, Bonus Books published her Funding
6
Evil: How Terrorism Is Financed and How to Stop It. Sheikh Khalid
Bin Mahfouz, a Saudi billionaire, and two of his sons sued Ehrenfeld
and her publisher in Britain over the book’s allegations that he was
process; or (ii) where the defendant provides an interactive computer service, unless the
judgment is consistent with Section 230 of the Communications Act. 28 U.S.C. §§
4102(b)–(c).
2. See ANNA S. HENNING & VIVIAN S. CHU, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40497,
“LIBEL TOURISM”: BACKGROUND AND LEGAL ISSUES 3 (2010), at 8.
3. See e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 111-154, at 4 (2009); Libel Tourism: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Commercial & Admin. L. of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong.
18 (2009) [hereinafter Libel Tourism] (statement of Bruce D. Brown, Libel Defense
Attorney, Baker & Hostetler), available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgibin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=111_house_hearings&docid=f:47316.pdf.
4. ANNA S. HENNING & VIVIAN S. CHU, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40497, “LIBEL
TOURISM”: BACKGROUND AND LEGAL ISSUES 1 (footnote omitted).
5. See e.g., S. REP. NO. 111-224, at 3 (2010); H.R. REP. NO. 111-54, at 3–4 (2009),
http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=111_cong_reports&docid=f:hr
154.111.pdf.
6. RACHEL EHRENFELD, FUNDING EVIL: HOW TERRORISM IS FINANCED AND
HOW TO STOP IT (2003).
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7

involved in funding terrorism. Mahfouz, who died in 2009, was a
frequent litigant who, by one estimate, sued or threatened to sue
8
critics in Britain at least thirty-three times. In the Ehrenfeld case,
neither the plaintiff nor the defendant lived in Britain, and the book
had not been published there, but twenty-three copies had been sold
there via the Internet. In addition, an excerpt featuring Mahfouz had
9
been available online. Ehrenfeld did not defend herself (simply
10
challenging jurisdiction can cost over $100,000 in Britain). The court
awarded Mahfouz a default judgment as well as attorneys’ fees
11
totaling around $225,000.
Ehrenfeld filed suit in New York seeking a declaratory judgment
that the British ruling was unenforceable in the United States, but the
12
court held that it lacked jurisdiction over Mahfouz. In response,
New York enacted “Rachel’s Law,” officially called the Libel
Terrorism Protection Act, which instructs state courts not to enforce
foreign defamation judgments unless the country’s defamation law
offers “at least as much protection for freedom of speech and press”
13
as the U.S. and New York constitutions. The New York statute also
provides for injunctive relief against those seeking enforcement of
14
15
such judgments. Several other states enacted similar laws.

7. Mahfouz v. Ehrenfeld, [2005] EWHC (Q.B.) 1156, [16] (Eng.).
8. See Douglas Martin, Khalid bin Mahfouz, Saudi Banker, Dies at 60, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 27, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/27/world/middleeast/27mahfouz.html; S.
REP. NO. 111-224, at 9 (2010) (describing additional views of Sen. Kyl). See also Libel
Tourism, supra note 2, at 14 (statement of Rachel Ehrenfeld) (referring to the “nearly
forty cases” in which Mahfouz had been involved). See also Mahfouz, EWHC (Q.B.),
[35]–[38] (Eng.) (illustrating examples of some of Mahfouz’s other cases).
9. Mahfouz, EWHC (Q.B.) [22] (Eng.).
10. PROGRAMME IN COMPARATIVE MEDIA LAW AND POLICY, A COMPARATIVE
STUDY OF COSTS IN DEFAMATION PROCEEDINGS ACROSS EUROPE 187 (2008),
http://pcmlp.socleg.ox.ac.uk/sites/pcmlp.socleg.ox.ac.uk/files/defamationreport.
pdf; CULTURE, MEDIA, AND SPORT COMMITTEE, PRESS STANDARDS, PRIVACY, AND
LIBEL, Vol. 2 (2010) [hereinafter Press Standards, Privacy, and Libel Vol 2.] (testimony of
Charmain Gooch, Director, Global Witness), available at http://www.publications.
parliament.uk/pa/cm200910/cmselect/cmcumeds/362/362ii.pdf.
11. Libel Tourism, supra note 2, at 3 (statement of Re. Trent Franks).
12. See Ehrenfeld v. Mahfouz, 518 F.3d 102 (2d Cir. 2008); EMILY C. BARBOUR,
CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R 41417, THE SPEECH ACT: THE FEDERAL RESPONSE TO
“LIBEL TOURISM” 4–5 & n.29, 9 (2010), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/
misc/R41417.pdf.
13. N.Y. CPLR § 5304(b)(8). See also BARBOUR, supra note 9, at 8–9; Rachel
Ehrenfeld, California Acts to Stop Libel Tourism, HUFFINGTON POST, May 5, 2009,
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/dr-rachel-ehrenfeld/california-acts-to-stopl_b_196666.html.
14. See CONG. RESEARCH SERV., supra note 9, at 8–9.
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Many libel suits or threatened suits involving Americans have
been settled before trial. For example, Mahfouz sued Cambridge
University Press over Alms for Jihad: Charity and Terrorism in the
Islamic World, written by two Americans, Robert Collins and J.
16
The
Millard Burr, for alleging that he was tied to terrorism.
publisher settled the case for a “substantial” amount, issued an
apology, pulled all remaining copies of the book, and urged libraries
17
to destroy their copies. When the wife of the first president of
Pakistan threatened to sue an American publisher in Britain over
From Plassey to Pakistan: The Family History of Iskander Mirza, by
Maryland resident Humayun Mirza, the publisher agreed to destroy
18
the first printing of the book. Art Journal, based in New York, paid
$75,000 and issued an apology to an Israeli scholar who threatened to
19
sue in Britain over a negative book review.
Transnational forum shopping, of course, is commonplace. In
fact, thanks to the size of jury awards, the United States is frequently
20
the favored forum.
But this is not the case when the litigation
involves free expression. With the First Amendment’s expansive
protection of speech, the United States “remains a recalcitrant outlier
to a growing international understanding of what the freedom of

15. See CAL. CIV. PRO. CODE § 1717(c)(2009); 735 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/12-621(b)(7)
(2008); FLA. STAT. § 55.605(2)(h)(2005); BARBOUR, supra note 9, at 8–9. The SPEECH
Act probably preempts Rachel’s Law and comparable laws. See id. at 11–13.
16. See Libel Tourism, supra note 3, at 22 (statement of Bruce D. Brown).
17. Id.; Mahfouz’s website says that libraries were asked only to insert an erratum
sheet.
Press Release, Kendall Freeman, Sheikh Khalid Bin Mahfouz Receives
Comprehensive Apology from Cambridge University Press (July 30, 2007), available at
http://www.binmahfouz.info/news_20070730.html. However, Library Journal reported
that Cambridge asked libraries to take the book out of circulation. Andrew Albanese &
Jennifer Pinkowski, ALA to Libraries: Keep Alms for Jihad, Pulped in the UK, LIBR. J.,
Aug. 23, 2007, available at http://www.libraryjournal.com/lj/community/legislation/851425270/story.csp.
18. See Libel Tourism, supra note 3, at 18–19 (statement of Bruce D. Brown).
19. See Marc Perelman, Israeli Art Critic Wins Legal Battles, FORWARD, July 4, 2008,
available at http://www.forward.com/articles/13662/.
20. See ANDREW BELL, FORUM SHOPPING AND VENUE IN TRANSNATIONAL
LITIGATION 28 ¶ 2.14 (2003); Emil Petrossian, In Pursuit of the Perfect Forum:
Transnational Forum Shopping in the United States and England, 40 LOY. L.A. L. REV.
1257, 1266 (2007).
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21

expression entails.”
Accordingly, plaintiffs file libel suits in
22
jurisdictions less protective of speech whenever possible.
Americans have faced libel litigation in Canada, Brazil, Australia,
Indonesia, Singapore, New Zealand, Kyrgyzstan, France, and
23
elsewhere. But Britain has proven to be the destination of choice
for libel tourists. A report from the British Ministry of Justice in
24
March 2010 listed fifty libel tourism cases filed there. London has
25
repeatedly been called the “libel capital of the world.”
Why is Britain so appealing to libel tourists, especially when
compared to the United States? Substantively, British law strongly
favors libel plaintiffs:
 It requires the defendant to prove truth, whereas in the United
States and most other countries, the plaintiff must generally
26
prove falsity. For instance, when David Irving sued American

21. Frederick Schauer, The Exceptional First Amendment 2 (John F. Kennedy School
of Government, Harvard University, Faculty Working Paper RWP05-021, February 2005),
available at http://web.hks.harvard.edu/publications/workingpapers/citation.aspx?PubId
=2554.
22. See ANNA S. HENNING & VIVIAN S. CHU, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40497,
“LIBEL TOURISM”: BACKGROUND AND LEGAL ISSUES (2010), at 1.
23. See Are Foreign Libel Lawsuits Chilling Americans' First Amendment Rights?
Before the S. Comm. On the Judiciary, (Feb. 23, 2010) (testimony of Kurt Wimmer,
Partner, Covington & Burling, LLP) [hereinafter Wimmer Testimony], available at
http://judiciary.senate.gov/hearings/testimony.cfm?id=4414&wit_id=9121; Libel Tourism,
supra note 2, at 49, n.29 (statement of Laura R. Handman, Partner, Davis Wright
Tremaine, LLP); BARBOUR, supra note 9, at 1–2; Drew Sullivan, Libel Tourism: Silencing
the Press Through Transnational Legal Threats—A Report to the Center for International
Media Assistance 19–21 (Jan. 6, 2010), http://cima.ned.org/sites/default/files/CIMALibel_Tourism-Report.pdf; Adam Liptak, From a Book Review to a Criminal Trial in
France, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 21, 2011, at A14.
24. MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, REPORT OF THE LIBEL WORKING GROUP 52–63 (2010),
available at http://www.justice.gov.uk/publications/docs/libel-working-group-report.pdf.
25. See, e.g. Mark Stephens, England and Wales, in INTERNATIONAL LIBEL AND
PRIVACY HANDBOOK 283 (Charles J. Glasser Jr. ed., 2d ed. 2009); Doreen Carvajal,
Britain, a Destination for “Libel Tourism” N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 20, 2008, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/01/20/technology/20iht-libel21.1.9346664.html.
26. See CULTURE, MEDIA, AND SPORT COMM., PRESS STANDARDS, PRIVACY, AND
LIBEL, Vol. 1 (2010), at ¶ 117 [hereinafter Press Standards, Privacy and Libel Vol. 1];
RODNEY A. SMOLLA, LAW OF DEFAMATION § 1:9 (2d ed. 2010); English PEN and Index
on Censorship, Free Speech Is Not for Sale: The Impact of English Libel Law on Freedom
of Expression 8 (2009), available at http://libelreform.org/reports/LibelDoc_LowRes.pdf.
The UN Human Rights Committee suggested that Britain consider adopting “enhanced
pleading requirements (e.g., requiring a plaintiff to make some preliminary showing of
falsity and absence of ordinary journalistic standards).” Human Rights Comm.,
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: Consideration of Reports Submitted
by States Parties Under Article 40 of the Covenant—United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland, July 7–25, 2008, ¶ 25, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/GBR/CO/6, CCPR 93d Sess.
(2008) [hereinafter Human Rights Comm.], available at http://www.statewatch.org/
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historian Deborah Lipstadt for having called him a Holocaust
denier and a disreputable historian, her legal team had to
submit evidence of the existence of gas chambers at Auschwitz
in order to show what Irving had misrepresented or suppressed
27
information.
 Where a defendant cannot prove the truth of the defamatory
assertion, the only other broadly applicable defense in Britain is
28
the Reynolds defense, which covers “responsible journalism.”
However, Reynolds is narrowly applied only to coverage of
29
matters deemed to be in the public interest, and, although
30
courts are divided, it may cover only journalist defendants.
Moreover, mounting a Reynolds defense is pricey: it can cost
31
from $150,000 to over $300,000.
 British libel claims are weighed according to the same standard
regardless of the plaintiff’s status. In fact, Britain’s Supreme
Court Procedure Committee in 1991 rejected a higher standard
for public figures, in part because “it would be quite contrary to
the tradition of our common law that citizens are not divided
32
into different classes.” By contrast, public officials and public
news/2008/jul/uk-un-hr.pdf. The plaintiff in a British libel case must establish the elements
of publication, identification, and defamatory meaning. PROGRAMME IN COMP. MEDIA
L. & POL., supra note 10, at 51. The U.S. Supreme Court has held that a public-figure
plaintiff must prove falsity, and so must a private-figure plaintiff where the speech is of
public concern. Phila. Newspapers v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767 (1986); N.Y. Times v. Sullivan,
376 U.S. 254 (1964).
27. See generally DEBORAH E. LIPSTADT, HISTORY ON TRIAL: MY DAY IN COURT
WITH DAVID IRVING (2005).
28. Reynolds v. Times Newspapers, [2001] 2 AC 127 (H.L.)(Eng.).
29. See id.; Jameel v. Dow Jones & Co., [2005] EWCA (Civ.) 75[¶28](Eng.);
BARBOUR, supra note 9, at 3–4; Stephens, supra note 20, at 273–74.
30. Compare Kearns v. General Counsel of the Bar, [2003] EWCA (Civ) 331 [¶ 8]
(Eng.) (holding that the “Reynolds defense” is limited to the mass media), with Seaga v.
Harper, [2008] UKPC 9 (holding that the defense applies generally), and Lord Hoffmann,
The Libel Tourism Myth, Dame Anne Ebsworth Memorial Lecture, Feb. 6, 2010, available
at http://www.indexoncensorship.org/2010/02/the-libel-tourism-myth/. For American law’s
equal treatment of media and nonmedia defendants, see Dun & Bradstreet Inc. v.
Greenmoss Builders Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 773 & n.4 (1985) (White, J., concurring).
31. Press Standards, Privacy, and Libel Vol. 2, supra note 7, at 246 (testimony of
Mark Stephens, Senior Member, Intellectual Property and Media, Finer Stephens
Innocent LLP), available at http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200910/cmselect
/cmcumeds/362/362ii.pdf. See also MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, supra note 24, at 24 (stating that
“[r]egional media editors often have limited budgets and therefore see Reynolds as a
defence of last resort”).
32. Reynolds v. Times Newspapers Ltd., [1998] 3 All ER 961 (Civ.), § 13 (Eng.). See
Human Rights Comm., supra note 21, at 7 ¶ 25 (recommending that Britain consider an
actual malice test for public officials and prominent public figures); Stephens, supra note
25, at 273.
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figures must meet the higher “actual malice” standard to prevail
in the United States under New York Times v. Sullivan and its
33
progeny.
Revealingly, one British lawyer calls Sullivan “a
34
defamer’s charter.”
 Unlike American plaintiffs, British plaintiffs can win damages
without proving harm to their reputations. British law creates
an “irrebuttable presumption . . . that the publication of a
defamatory article causes damage to the reputation of the
35
person defamed.” Indeed, a plaintiff need not even have a
36
reputation in Britain before the appearance of the publication.
 Britain follows the multiple-publication rule, whereas the
United States follows the single-publication rule. That means
that in Britain, a new libel can arise each time an individual
accesses an article—potentially rendering the one-year statute
of limitations meaningless, especially for material in online
37
archives.
These five factors help explain why plaintiffs win an estimated
38
ninety percent of British libel cases. Their victories also tend to
remain intact, too. Whereas American appellate courts closely
examine facts as well as law in libel cases and overturn nearly three39
quarters of adverse libel judgments, no such rule applies in Britain.
Then there is the matter of money. Costs of libel litigation in
40
Britain are by far the highest in Europe. A plaintiff’s lawyer who

33. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 280 (1964).
34. Press Standards, Privacy, and Libel Vol. 2, supra note 7, at 43 (testimony of Rod
Christie-Miller, Schillings Lawyers).
35. Mardas v. N.Y. Times Co., [2008] EWHC (Q.B.) 3135, [12] (Eng.). See also Press
Standards, Privacy, and Libel Vol. 1, supra note 21, at 36 ¶ 118; Stephens, supra note 21, at
272. The First Amendment requires a plaintiff to come forth with evidence of “actual
injury.” Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 350 (1974).
36. See Jameel v. Dow Jones & Co., [2005] EWCA Civ. 75, [28].
37. See MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, supra note 19, at 81; Press Standards, Privacy, and
Libel Vol. 1, supra note 21, at 57 ¶¶ 218–222; Press Standards, Privacy, and Libel Vol. 2,
supra note 7, at 16 (testimony of Keith Mathieson, Reynolds Porter Chamberlain LLP);
JOSHUA ROZENBERG, PRIVACY AND THE PRESS 204 (OUP Oxford 2004); Sullivan, supra
note 18, at 18–19. However, the European Court of Human Rights did say that the
passage of “a significant lapse of time” might violate the European Convention on Human
Rights. Times Newspapers v. United Kingdom, Apps. No. 3002/03 & 23676/03, 14 ¶ 48
(Eur. Ct. H. R. 2010). For the American approach, see Shively v. Bozanich, 80 P.3d 676,
685, 688 (Cal. 2003); Thomas H. Golden & Stephen B. Vogel, United States, in INTER.
LIBEL AND PRIVACY HANDBOOK 58 (Charles J. Glasser Jr. ed., 2d ed. 2009).
38. See Sullivan, supra note 16, at 19.
39. See Libel Tourism, supra note 3, at 19 (testimony of Bruce D. Brown).
40. See PROGRAMME IN COMPARATIVE MEDIA LAW AND POLICY, supra note 6, at
187; Press Standards, Privacy, and Libel Vol. 2, supra note 7, at 244.
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agrees to a Conditional Fee Arrangement (“CFA”) receives nothing
if the client loses, but receives a “success fee” paid by the other side if
41
the client prevails—an arrangement unique in Europe. Previously,
the success fee amounted to as much as 100 percent of the base fee,
but in January 2011, the European Court of Human Rights in
Strasbourg deemed such large fee enhancements an infringement on
42
free expression. The court did not indicate what level of success fee
would be permissible; one proposal would cap the fees at ten
43
percent. Plaintiffs can also seek after-the-event (“ATE”) insurance
to cover the defendant’s legal fees should the defendant win. The
insurance company generally charges no premium if the defendant
wins, but a successful plaintiff can recover the cost of the ATE
premium from the defendant, along with legal fees (including a
44
success fee) and damages. Even in the absence of CFAs and ATE
insurance, some British firms representing plaintiffs vary their rates
depending on whether their clients prevail. Fees are discounted for
unsuccessful clients but “enhanced” for successful ones, when the
45
losing defendants must pay.
Such rules matter to American
defendants, given that American courts routinely enforce foreign
46
judgments for attorneys’ fees.
Little of this would matter to Americans if Britain followed
prudent rules for jurisdiction. Although the British courts, in theory,
will accept jurisdiction over a libel case only if the publication caused
47
“real and substantial” harm to the plaintiff’s reputation in Britain,
the requirement has proved all but toothless because jurisdiction may
48
exist even if only a handful of Britons read the publication. The
contrast with American law is particularly stark with regard to online
libel. To maintain a libel lawsuit for Internet speech, the Fourth

41. See Press Standards, Privacy, and Libel, supra note 21, at 61 ¶ 236; PROGRAMME
note 6, at 161.
42. MGN Ltd. v. United Kingdom, App. No. 39401/04 (Eur. Ct. H. R. 2011).
43. See id. ¶¶ 115–20.
44. See PROGRAMME IN COMPARATIVE MEDIA LAW AND POLICY, supra note 6, at
11, n.18.
45. See, e.g., Carter-Ruck, Media Law: Funding, http://www.carter-ruck.com/
Media%20Law/Funding.asp (last visited Mar. 19, 2011).
46. See, e.g., Somportex Ltd. v. Phila. Chewing Gum Corp., 453 F.2d 435, 438 (3d Cir.
1971) (enforcing British judgment that included attorneys’ fees).
47. See Berezovsky v. Michaels, [2000] 2 All ER 98, [2000] WLR 1004, [2000] All ER
(D) 643 (House of Lords, May 11, 2000); H.R. REP. NO. 111-154, at 3 (2009).
48. See Libel Tourism, supra note 2, at 134–35 (response by Bruce D. Brown to posthearing questions). Cf. H.R. REP. NO. 111-54, at 3 (comparing American and British
treatment of jurisdiction in defamation cases).
IN COMPARATIVE MEDIA LAW AND POLICY, supra
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Circuit, in an influential decision, stressed that the speech must be
49
“targeted” at the jurisdiction. Mere accessibility is not enough. The
British Court of Appeal, however, expressly rejected that standard in
2004, stating that a defendant who publishes on the Internet “has
50
‘targeted’ every jurisdiction where his text may be downloaded.”
Accordingly, the court allowed one American (boxing promoter Don
King) to sue another American (a lawyer named Judd Burstein) in
51
Britain.
To address the chilling effect of libel tourism, Congress
52
considered several legislative options. All would have instructed
American courts not to enforce foreign libel judgments that fall short
of First Amendment standards. The SPEECH Act further allowed
libel defendants to seek declaratory judgments on the enforceability
53
of the foreign judgments, and provided for attorneys’ fees. In an
approach modeled after anti-SLAPP (strategic lawsuit against public
participation) laws, other bills would have allowed libel defendants to
54
file countersuits against libel-tourist plaintiffs. In the countersuit,
the libel defendant could seek an injunction declaring the judgment
unenforceable, as well as damages—treble damages in some
circumstances. Jurisdiction over the libel-tourist plaintiff would rest
on the American service of process, but the House Judiciary
55
Committee deemed this jurisdictional approach unduly aggressive.
Critics contended that other countries might respond by authorizing
countersuits against American plaintiffs; that claiming personal
jurisdiction over a foreign defendant might violate due process; and
that in any event, American courts need not claim overly expansive
56
jurisdiction just because British courts do. In the SPEECH Act,

49.
50.
51.
52.

Young v. New Haven Advocate, 315 F.3d 256, 258 (4th Cir. 2002).
Lewis v. King, [2004] EWCA (Civ) 1329, [34] (Eng.).
See id. at ¶¶ 3–5.
See ANNA C. HENNING & VIVIAN S. CHU, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40497,
“LIBEL TOURISM”: BACKGROUND AND LEGAL ISSUES 3 (2010), at 6–9 (summarizing
bills); Libel Tourism, supra note 2, at 5.
53. Pub. L. No. 111-223, 124 Stat. 2381 (2010). The attorneys’ fees are limited to the
enforcement action, and not available in the action for a declaratory judgment. See S.
REP. NO. 111-224, at 4 (2010) (Conf. Rep.).
54. See Free Speech Protection Act of 2009, S. 449 & H.R. 1304, 111th Cong. §3(a)–
(d) (2009); HENNING & CHU, supra note 46, at 13–14 (summarizing bills); Are Foreign
Libel Lawsuits Chilling Americans’ First Amendment Rights? Before the S. Comm. On the
Judiciary, at 6–9 (Feb. 23, 2010) (testimony of Bruce D. Brown, Libel Attorney, Baker &
Hostetler LLP) [hereinafter Brown 2010 Testimony] (arguing for anti-SLAPP approach),
available at http://judiciary.senate.gov/pdf/10-02-23Brown%27sTestimony.pdf.
55. See BARBOUR, supra note 9, at 10.
56. See H.R. REP. NO. 111-154, at 6; HENNING & CHU, supra note 46, at 16.
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Congress addressed the issue of enforcing foreign libel judgments
57
without providing for countersuits.

II. Breach of Privacy in Britain
Modern British privacy law principally rests on the 1950
European Convention on Human Rights, as construed and applied by
the European Court of Human Rights. Article 8 of the convention
provides, “[e]veryone has the right to respect for his private and
family life, his home and his correspondence.” Under Article 10,
58
“Everyone has the right to freedom of expression.” The European
Court, along with the British courts that follow its precedents, seeks
to balance the two.
However, privacy often seems to trump what one Strasbourg
59
judge dismissively called the “fetish of the freedom of the press.” In
Von Hannover v. Germany, an especially far-reaching case, the court
concluded that the press had infringed the rights of Princess Caroline
of Monaco by publishing photographs of her and her family taken in
60
These photos did not advance “any debate of general
public.
interest,” the court said, but rather served solely “to satisfy the
61
curiosity of a particular readership.”
For the Strasbourg court,
photographing people in public without their consent can violate the
privacy protection of Article 8, with Article 10’s guarantee of free
expression providing no defense. Princess Caroline has another case
currently pending before the court, again challenging the publication
62
of photographs of her and her family.
Although the European Convention on Human Rights is sixty
years old, rulings of the Strasbourg court interpreting it became
(mostly) binding on British courts starting just over a decade ago.
International agreements have no effect in Britain until Parliament
incorporates them into domestic law, which occurred with the Human

57. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 4101–4105 (2011).
58. European Convention on Human Rights, Rome 4.XI.1950, Arts. 8, 10, available
at http://conventions.coe.int/treaty/en/Treaties/Html/005.htm.
59. Von Hannover v. Germany, App. No. 59320/00 (Eur. Ct. H. R. 2004) (Zupancic,
J., concurring).
60. Id. at ¶¶ 11–17.
61. Id. at ¶ 65.
62. See Press Release, European Court of Human Rights, Hearing, 2 (Oct. 13, 2010),
available at http://ns3.riss.ro/codex/contents.nsf/vWebAccessDocuments/9AD8AB686BA
D7999C22577BE00412A72/$file/Grand_Chamber_Hearing_Springer_v__Germany_and_v
on_Hannover_v__Germany_13_10_10.pdf.
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Rights Act of 1998, that took full effect in 2000. The Human Rights
Act directs British judges to apply the rulings of the European Court
64
except where they conflict with rulings of the House of Lords.
Despite the relatively brief history of Article 8 privacy cases in
65
Britain, by one estimate they now outnumber libel ones.
In a British case for breach of privacy, sometimes called misuse of
66
private information, the judge follows the Strasbourg court in
balancing the Article 8 privacy right against the Article 10 right of
free expression. This entails a two-part test, as illustrated below.
The first inquiry examines whether the plaintiff had a reasonable
67
expectation of privacy. One case involved a photo of the author J.
K. Rowling with her husband and eighteen-month-old son on a public
68
street, published in the Sunday Express. Rowling sued on her son’s
behalf. The judge dismissed the case, but the Court of Appeal
reinstated it, stating that under Von Hannover, even “routine acts
such as a visit to a shop or a ride on a bus” can fall within a
69
To determine whether a
reasonable expectation of privacy.
reasonable expectation of privacy exists, the Court of Appeal said a
judge must take into account a host of factors:
the attributes of the claimant, the nature of the activity in
which the claimant was engaged, the place at which it was
happening, the nature and purpose of the intrusion, the
absence of consent and whether it was known or could be
inferred, the effect on the claimant and the circumstances in
which and the purposes for which the information came into
70
the hands of the publisher.

63. See ROZENBERG, supra note 31, at 227; Press Standards, Privacy, and Libel Vol.
1, supra note 21, at 12 ¶ 10.
64. See Human Rights Act, 1998, c. 42, § 2(1); Murray v. Express Newspapers, [2008]
EWCA (Civ.) 446 [20] (Eng.); Ash v. McKennitt, [2005] EWHC 3003 (Q.B.) [62] (Eng.).
65. See David Eady, Speech at the University of Hertfordshire (Nov. 10, 2009), 13,
available at http://www.judiciary.gov.uk/NR/rdonlyres/1D20B7A7-62FB-461D-BA122437CB8CF61A/0/justiceeadyunivofhertfordshire101109.pdf.
66. Lord Neuberger of Abbotsbury, Master of the Rolls, Privacy and Freedom of
Expression: A Delicate Balance, Speech at Eton (Apr. 28, 2010), 6, available at
http://www.judiciary.gov.uk/NR/rdonlyres/D034D005-2956-4E2A-903C-41B74287F9FF/
0/morprivacyfreedomexpression28042010.pdf.
67. See Campbell v. MGN Ltd., [2004] UKHL 22[22] (appeal taken from Eng.).
68. Murray v. Express Newspapers, [2008] EWCA (Civ.) 446 [1] (Eng.).
69. Id. at ¶ 56.
70. Id. at ¶ 36.
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For an editor on a deadline trying to decide whether to publish a
photo, this calculus can be complex and uncertain. The fact that the
photograph has already been published, moreover, may not be a
defense as “there will be a fresh intrusion of privacy when each
additional viewer sees the photograph and even when one who has
seen a previous publication of the photograph, is confronted by a
71
fresh publication of it.”
Not all cases involve photography. Prince Charles successfully
sued the Mail on Sunday for publishing excerpts of his diaries, even
though he acknowledged distributing copies of them to at least
72
fourteen people.
In another case, Justice David Eady of the
73
Queen’s Bench—the leading force behind British privacy law —ruled
that a woman named Niema Ash had breached the privacy of the
singer Loreena McKennitt by publishing a book about their former
74
friendship. Von Hannover demonstrated the need for “respect for
75
private life, on some occasions, in relatively public circumstances,”
the judge said, adding that even “trivial,” “anodyne,” and “banal[]”
information might be covered by a reasonable expectation of
76
privacy. Thus, Ash had a right under Article 10 to tell her own
story, but she could not discuss her ex-friend’s private life in doing
77
so.
If a given plaintiff does have a reasonable privacy expectation, a
British court moves on to the next step in the analysis: determining
78
whether the publication advanced the public interest. A leading

71. Douglas v. Hello Ltd., [2005] EWCA (Civ.) 595 [105] (Eng.).
72. See HRH The Prince of Wales v. Associated Newspapers, [2006] EWHC 522 (Ch)
[14] (Eng.). The defense maintained that the diaries had been circulated to between fifty
and seventy-five people. Id.
73. See Matthew Norman, Eady Has a Fight on His Hands to Rebuild Temple of
Privacy, INDEPENDENT, Feb. 8, 2010 (referring to “the temple to privacy [Justice Eady] so
painstakingly constructed”), available at http://www.independent.co.uk/news/media/
opinion/matthew-norman/matthew-norman-eady-has-a-fight-on-his-hands-to-rebuildtemple-of-privacy-1892208.html; Frances Gibb, How Red-Top Lawyer Mr. Justice Eady
Became Privacy Judge, TIMES, July 25, 2008, available at http://business.
timesonline.co.uk/tol/business/law/article4393286.ece (stating that “Mr. Justice Eady has
created almost single-handedly what is now a privacy law in Britain”). But see Press
Standards, Privacy, and Libel Vol. 1, supra note 21, at 27 ¶¶ 75–76 (stating that Justice
Eady has not dominated the development of British privacy law).
74. McKennitt v. Ash, [2005] EWHC (Q.B.) 3003 (appeal taken from Eng.).
75. Id. ¶ 50.
76. Id. ¶ 58.
77. Id. at ¶ 77.
78. This is the same term but not necessarily the same standard as in the Reynolds
defense for defamation. See Campbell v. MGN Ltd., [2002] EWCA Civ. 1373 [61] (Eng.)
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79

case involved Naomi Campbell. Campbell conceded that the Daily
Mirror was justified in revealing that she was attending Narcotics
Anonymous meetings in 2001 because she had repeatedly denied
80
using illegal drugs. However, the House of Lords in Campbell v.
MGN Ltd. said that the newspaper had breached her privacy by
publishing a photo of her on a public street outside the meeting place,
along with some details of her treatment due to the public interest
81
not extending that far.
A valid public interest is not dispositive; rather, the public interest
is weighed against the expectation of privacy. “[E]ven where there is
a genuine public interest, . . . sometimes such interests . . . have to
yield to the individual citizen’s right to the effective protection of
82
private life.” In Prince Charles’s case, the court concluded that the
public would be interested in his journals—his “every thought and
action [are], in some quarters at least, a matter of endless
83
fascination”—but that wasn’t enough. The contents of the journals
were not “necessary in a democratic society for the protection of the
84
rights and freedoms of others.” This necessity test sets a remarkably
high bar; one could argue that not even the Pentagon Papers could
qualify as truly necessary to protect anyone’s rights and freedoms.
Elsewhere, Justice Eady has given public interest a somewhat more
generous definition, though he still called it “a very high test”
whether the information “make[s] a contribution to a debate of
85
general interest.” In Justice Eady’s view, a court assessing the public
interest must “investigat[e] the defendant’s motive for using the right
of free speech and grad[e] those motives (as between at one extreme
e.g. ‘political speech’ and at the other what has been called in the

(stating that “[w]e do not believe that the same test of public interest applies to justify
publication in these two very different torts”).
79. “Even the judges know who Naomi Campbell is,” wrote one judge. Id. at ¶ 127
(Baroness Hale of Richmond).
80. Id. at ¶¶ 23–24 (Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead), ¶¶ 36, 42 (Lord Hoffmann).
81. See Campbell v. MGN Ltd., [2004] UKHL 22 [117, 124] (Lord Hope of
Craighead) [147, 156] (Baroness Hale of Richmond), [165, 169] (Lord Carswell). The
Strasbourg court’s Von Hannover decision was issued a short time later. The 2011
Strasbourg case limiting CFA fees was a continuation of the Campbell litigation. MGN
Ltd. v. United Kingdom, App. No. 39401/04 (Eur. Ct. H. R. 2011).
82. McKennitt v. Ash, [2005] EWHC (Q.B.) 3003, [57].
83. HRH The Prince of Wales v. Associated Newspapers, [2006] EWHC 522 (Ch)
[133].
84. Id. (emphasis in original).
85. Mosley v. News Group Newspapers Ltd., [2008] EWHC 1777 (Q.B.) [131]
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
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86

House of Lords ‘tittle tattle’).” In another case, Justice Eady barred
a defendant from revealing, among other things, details of dinnertable conversations with Tony Blair. These details fell on the “tittle87
tattle” end of the scale, despite Blair’s prominence.
A high-profile privacy case involved Max Mosley, the head of
Formula 1 racing and the son of the 1930s fascist leader Sir Oswald
88
Mosley. A Murdoch tabloid, the News of the World, charged that
Max Mosley had participated in a Nazi-themed sadomasochistic
89
(“S&M”) orgy with five prostitutes.
The newspaper published
photographs of the orgy and posted excerpts of a video taken by one
90
of the prostitutes. Mosley admitted to the S&M session and the five
91
prostitutes, but insisted that the Nazi allegation was a lie. He sued
the News of the World for invasion of privacy (and later for libel as
92
well). In Mosley v. News Group Newspapers, Ltd., Justice Eady
concluded that Mosley was truthful: Although one woman had worn a
German military jacket and Mosley had spoken in German, there had
93
been no Nazi theme. In the judge’s view, the newspaper would have
been justified in revealing a Nazi orgy at least to Mosley’s Formula 1
94
bosses. Doing so, Justice Eady said, would have advanced the public
95
interest. However, the revelation of a Nazi-less S&M orgy failed to
96
pass the public-interest test. The judge ordered the News of the
World to pay close to $100,000, seemingly a record-setting damage
97
award for a privacy case. Including Mosley’s legal fees (without any
86. David Eady, Privacy and the Press: Where Are We Now?, Speech to Conference
on Justice (Dec. 1, 2009), available at http://www.judiciary.gov.uk/docs/speeches/eady-jjustice-conf.pdf, at 4. See also Mosley, [2008] EWHC 1777 (Q.B.) [15].
87. See Lord Browne of Madingley v. Associated Newspapers, [2007] EWHC 202
(Q.B.) [59].
88. Mosley v. News Group Newspapers Ltd., [2008] EWHC 1777 (Q.B.) [1], [26].
89. Id. at ¶ 1.
90. Id. at ¶¶ 1–2, 5, 27.
91. Id. at ¶¶ 36, 44.
92. Oliver Luft, Max Mosley Launches Libel Action Against News of the World,
GUARDIAN, Apr. 3, 2009, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/media/2009/apr/03/maxmosley-news-of-the-world.
93. Mosley, [2008] EWHC 1777, [36], [123].
94. Id. at ¶ 122.
95. Id.
96. Id. at ¶ 123.
97. Id. at ¶ 236. See also Afua Hirsch, Privacy Law Will Grow, Bar Chief Predicts,
GUARDIAN, Dec. 15, 2008, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/media/2008/dec
/15/privacy-madonna-daily-mail; Leigh Holmwood & Stephen Brook, Max Mosley Wins
£60,000 in News of the World Privacy Case, GUARDIAN, July 24, 2008, available at
http://www.guardian.co.uk/media/2008/jul/24/privacy.newsoftheworld2; Mosley Wins Court
Case Over Orgy, BBC NEWS, July 24, 2008, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk
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success fee—he had no CFA) and its own legal fees, the case cost the
98
News of the World over $1.5 million.
The editor of Private Eye, Ian Hislop, derided Justice Eady’s
public-interest analysis in Mosley. Hislop told a Parliamentary
committee,
[Justice Eady] said[,] “We are a grown up cosmopolitan
country, whatever we do behind doors is entirely up to us—
unless there are Nazis in it, and then [disclosure] is in the
public interest.” Is it? The judgment makes no sense. Is [it]
your right to dance about as a Nazi private? Or is it you are
only allowed to dance about as a German officer? It is a silly
99
case.
As Hislop suggested, the public-interest test remains vague. In a
March 2010 speech, Justice Eady admitted that “it may be quite
difficult to anticipate the assessment the judge will make” in a privacy
100
case.
He added, “[t]here is quite often no right or wrong answer.
That is integral to the process. [D]ifferent persons may come up with
101
The lack of clarity
different answers on the same set of facts.”
engenders a chilling effect. In the wake of Mosley, the News of the
World’s editor, Colin Myler, said that “I probably now spend an equal
102
time talking to lawyers as to journalists.”
Most privacy cases in Britain settle. In 2008 and 2009, only the
103
Mosley proceeded through a full trial.
In those two years, British
newspapers reached settlement agreements in privacy lawsuits or
threatened suits involving Sienna Miller, Madonna, and Ashley Cole,

/2/hi/7523034.stm; Helen Pidd, Punishment That Was Not a Crime: Why Mosley Won in the
High Court, GUARDIAN, July 25, 2008, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/
media/2008/jul/25/mosley.privacy.
98. ROZENBERG, supra note 31, at 38(2) INDEX ON CENSORSHIP 98, 103 (2009).
99. Press Standards, Privacy, and Libel Vol. 2, supra note 7, at 195 (testimony of Ian
Hislop, Editor, Private Eye).
100. David Eady, Launch of New Centre for Law, Justice and Journalism, Speech
Delivered at City University, London, (Mar. 10, 2010), available at http://www.
judiciary.gov.uk/NR/rdonlyres/A49A9837-1D07-496D-934B-2379879EFAD8/0/eadyjcity
university10032010.pdf, at 6.
101. Id. Cf. JIH v. News Group Newspapers Ltd., [2011] EWCA (Civ.) 42 (Eng.) [3]
(stating that a court’s task in balancing privacy and free expression “can involve a
significant degree of subjectivity”).
102. Press Standards, Privacy, and Libel Vol. 2, supra note 7, at 176 Q769 (testimony
of Colin Myler, Editor, News of the World).
103. Press Standards, Privacy, and Libel Vol. 1, supra note 21, at 24 ¶ 61.
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104

among others.
According to the Parliamentary committee, “[t]he
high costs of litigation, combined with the legal uncertainty, owing to
the small amount of case law, undoubtedly discourages the media
105
from contesting privacy cases.” The cycle perpetuates itself: Cases
settle due to the paucity of case law, which prevents the development
of further case law.
In addition to awarding damages after the fact—even damages for
106
“hurt feelings” —British courts will grant an injunction to block
107
what is likely to constitute a breach of privacy. Total numbers are
108
Such orders have grown
unknown, as no agency keeps track.
109
increasingly frequent. The Wall Street Journal has reported that
some British papers are served with an injunction nearly every
110
month. In 2003, a court barred the press from revealing the name
and whereabouts of the former Mary Bell, who, at age eleven in 1968,
111
had murdered two four-year-olds.
The court said that publicity
112
would endanger Bell’s already shaky mental health. The fact that
she had cashed in on her notoriety, receiving “a substantial sum” for
cooperating with the author Gitta Sereny on the 1998 book Cries
113
Injunctions have targeted potential
Unheard, was immaterial.
sources as well as publishers. In a 2006 case, Justice Eady enjoined a
114
man from telling the media about his wife’s extramarital affair.
Some of the orders, including those in the Mary Bell case, are
contra mundum or John Doe injunctions, enforceable against anyone

104. See Afua Hirsch, Judge in Max Mosley Trial Hits Back at Criticism Over Privacy
Cases, GUARDIAN, Dec. 1, 2009, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk /2009/dec/
01/david-eady-privacy-trials-media.
105. Press Standards, Privacy, and Libel Vol. 1, supra note 21, at 24 ¶ 62. But see
Press Standards, Privacy, and Libel Vol. 2, supra note 7, at 482 (speech of Sir David Eady
to the Intellectual Property Lawyers’ Association, Feb. 18, 2009) [hereinafter Eady
Speech] (stating that “[t]he rarity of contested claims is largely because there are so few
stories where there is any hope of a public interest defence”).
106. McKennitt v. Ash, [2005] EWHC 3003 (Q.B.) ¶ 162; Archer v. Williams, [2003]
EWHC 1670 (Q.B.) ¶¶ 73, 75.
107. To get a preliminary injunction, plaintiffs must demonstrate that they are likely to
win at trial. See Human Rights Act, 1998, c. 42, § 12(3).
108. See Press Standards, Privacy, and Libel Vol. 1, supra note 21, at 18 ¶ 37, 27 ¶ 75.
109. See JIH v. News Group Newspapers Ltd., [2011] EWCA (Civ.) 42 [34] (Eng.).
110. Cassell Bryan-Low, Stars Boost Use of U.K. Gag Rules, WALL ST. J., Oct. 8, 2010.
111. See X (Formerly Known as Mary Bell) & Y v. O’Brien, [2003] EWHC 1101
(Q.B.), [9], [41]–[42], [60]–[61] (Eng.).
112. Id.
113. See id. at ¶ 6.
114. CC v. AB, [2006] EWHC 3083 (Q.B.), [58] (Eng.).
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115

who receives notice of them. Moreover, some of the injunctions are
secret; a news outlet can be held in contempt of court for revealing
116
their existence.
In one instance, the attorneys behind a secret
injunction told editors of The Guardian that they were forbidden to
publish details of an upcoming Parliamentary debate if it included
117
discussion of the injunction. And some injunctions are both contra
mundum and secret, such as one that Justice Eady issued in late 2009
barring any media outlet from publishing images of Tiger Woods
118
naked or involved in sexual activity.
To be sure, Britain is not the only country with plaintiff-friendly
privacy laws. The European Court of Human Rights covers the forty119
But as with libel
seven member states of the Council of Europe.
tourism, Britain is likely to become a popular forum for privacy
tourists owing to the expansive jurisdiction, the multiple-publication
rule, and the availability of CFAs and ATE insurance. Jeremy Dear
of the National Union of Journalists has said, “Britain has long been
the libel capital of the world. Now it’s in danger of becoming the
120
privacy capital.”

III. Publication of Private Facts in the United States
American privacy law differs sharply from British privacy law.
Not only is the United States committed to “the principle that debate
121
on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open,” but
in addition, “state action to punish the publication of truthful
122
information seldom can satisfy constitutional standards.”
Like the British action for breach of privacy, the American tort
for publication of private facts employs a two-part test. However, the
threshold question in the United States is not whether the plaintiff

115. See Press Standards, Privacy, and Libel Vol. 1, supra note 21, at 18 ¶ 36. A news
outlet need not be formally served with the injunction. “[E]ven though the newspaper is
not a party, it can still be liable for criminal contempt if it publishes the story knowing of
the prohibition against the ‘persons unknown.’” Eady Speech, supra note 86, at 479.
116. See Press Standards, Privacy, and Libel Vol. 1, supra note 21, at 31 ¶¶ 94–95.
117. Id. at 31–33 ¶¶ 94–102.
118. Justice Eady’s now-public order in Woods v. X & Y is at http://tmz.vo.llnwd.net/
o28/newsdesk/1210_schillings_doc_wm.pdf.
119. See EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS, COUNTRY FACT SHEETS, 2009,
available at http://www.echr.coe.int/NR/rdonlyres/C2E5DFA6-B53C-42D2-8512-034BD
3C889B0/0/FICHEPARPAYS_ENG_MAI2010.pdf, at 3.
120. Mariah Blake, Private Matters, COL. J. REV., Sept.-Oct. 2007, at 19 (quoting
Jeremy Dear).
121. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
122. Smith v. Daily Mail Publ’g Co., 433 U.S. 97, 102 (1979).
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had a reasonable expectation of privacy. Rather, it is whether the
123
revelation would be highly offensive to a reasonable person. Judge
Posner said in Haynes v. Knopf that the revelation must be “not
merely embarrassing and painful but deeply shocking” and
124
The
“shameful” to qualify for protection under privacy law.
threshold is a high one, as Judge Posner’s examples illustrate:
Most people in no wise deformed or disfigured would
nevertheless be deeply upset if nude photographs of
themselves were published in a newspaper or a book. They
feel the same way about photographs of their sexual activities,
however “normal,” or about a narrative of those activities, or
about having their medical records publicized. Although it is
well known that every human being defecates, no adult
human being in our society wants a newspaper to show a
125
picture of him defecating.
Judge Posner concluded that revelations about the Haynes plaintiff’s
“heavy drinking, his unstable employment, his adultery, [and] his
irresponsible and neglectful behavior toward his wife and children”
126
fell short of “highly offensive.” As the House of Lords observed in
Campbell, this is a much “stricter test” than reasonable expectation of
127
privacy.
The American test, moreover, is objective. It asks whether a
reasonable person would find the revelation highly offensive. The
Florida Supreme Court explained in 1944 that “[t]he protection . . .
must be restricted to ‘ordinary sensibilities,’ and cannot extend to
128
supersensitive or agoraphobia.” As the Mary Bell case illustrates,
by contrast, British courts inquire into the particular vulnerabilities of

123. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS , § 652D(a) (1977).
124. Haynes v. Knopf, 8 F.3d 1222, 1230, 1234–35 (7th Cir. 1993).
125. Id. at 1229.
126. Id. at 1230.
127. Campbell v. MGN Ltd., [2004] UKHL 22, [22] (Eng.).
128. Cason v. Baskin, 20 S.2d 243, 251 (Fla. 1944) (quoting 41 Am. Jur. 934). See also
William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REV. 383, 397 (1960) (“The law of privacy is not
intended for the protection of any shrinking soul who is abnormally sensitive about . . .
publicity.”) (footnote omitted); Roscoe Pound, Interests of Personality, part 1, 28 HARV.
L. REV. 343, 363 (1915) (“[A]s the injury [in invasion of privacy] is mental and subjective,
the difficulties . . . must, at least, confine legal securing of the interest to ordinary
sensibilities. Here, as in many other cases, in a weighing of interests the over-sensitive
must give way.”).

2011]

MORE SPEECH

397

129

the plaintiff.
There, those afflicted with depression, anxiety, or
other mental troubles may be accorded more generous privacy rights
than those not afflicted.
The other issue in an American court is not the “very high test” of
whether the revelation advanced a narrowly defined public interest,
but rather whether the revelation was of “legitimate concern to the
130
public.” Here, the courts defer to local standards. According to the
Restatement, “[A]ccount must be taken of the customs and
conventions of the community; and in the last analysis what is proper
131
becomes a matter of the community mores.” When the community
cares about “the misfortunes and frailties of neighbors and ‘public
figures,’” for example, a court will generally protect speech on those
132
Something
topics against a claim for publication of private facts.
falls outside the realm of “legitimate public interest,” according to the
Restatement, only when “the publicity ceases to be the giving of
information to which the public is entitled, and becomes a morbid and
sensational prying into private lives for its own sake, with which a
reasonable member of the public, with decent standards, would say
133
that he had no concern.” To a substantial extent, then, American
law protects information that interests the public. This is not so in
Britain, where a judge wrote in 2010, “[i]t is not enough for
information to be interesting to the public. Publication of the
134
information must be in the public interest.”
Additionally, in an American court, material that is of legitimate
concern to the public cannot lead to liability regardless of how
offensive it may be. British courts take a different approach. As
noted, one British court has said that “even where there is a genuine
public interest . . . sometimes such interests . . . have to yield to the
135
individual citizen’s right to the effective protection of private life.”

129. X (Formerly Known as Mary Bell) & Y v. O’Brien, [2003] EWHC 1101 (Q.B.)
(Eng.).
130. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 652D(b) (1977). The Restatement asserts
that the test of “legitimate concern to the public” is required by the First Amendment as
well as by common law. Id., cmt. d (citing Cox Broadcasting v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975)).
Cf. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 346 (1974) (stating, with regard to
determining whether news coverage advanced the public interest, that “[w]e doubt the
wisdom of committing this task to the conscience of judges”).
131. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 652D, cmt. h (1977).
132. Sidis v. F-R Pub. Corp., 113 F.2d 806, 809 (2d Cir. 1940).
133. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 652D, cmt. h (1977).
134. DFT v. TFD, [2010] EWHC 2335 (Q.B.) [19] (Eng.).
135. McKennitt v. Ash, [2005] EWHC 3003 (Q.B.) [57].
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In cases involving the news media, American courts often recast
136
This standard is
“legitimate public interest” as “newsworthy.”
broad and extends beyond front-page topics and news of government
to embrace the full range of “information concerning interesting
137
It embraces equally the details of
phases of human activity.”
138
United Nations deliberations and “the chitchat of a society editor,”
as well as “detailed reports of the piquant facts in matrimonial
litigation and the colorful escapades and didoes of well-known
139
140
persons,” “silly news,” and many other “matters of genuine, even
141
In making the
if more or less deplorable, popular appeal.”
newsworthiness evaluation, American courts substantially defer to
newsroom judgments. “Absent clear abuse, the courts will not
second-guess editorial decisions as to what constitutes matters of
142
By contrast, the cases involving Naomi
genuine public concern.”
Campbell, Prince Charles, and Max Mosley demonstrate that British
judges are quick to second-guess editorial decisions.
As in Britain, many American privacy cases involve photographs.
In a 1980 case, High Society Celebrity Skin magazine published a
topless photo of the actress Ann-Margret, taken from the film Magic.
A federal judge held that the newsworthy defense applied:
[T]he fact that the plaintiff, a woman who has occupied the
fantasies of many moviegoers over the years, chose to perform

136. See, e.g. Haynes v. Knopf, Inc., 8 F.3d 1222, 1232 (7th Cir. 1993); Shulman v.
Group W. Prods., 74 Cal. Rptr. 2d 843, 852–53 (1998).
137. Campbell v. Seabury Press, 614 F.2d 395, 397 (5th Cir. 1980). See also Jenkins v.
Dell Publ’g Co., 251 F.2d 447, 451 (3d Cir. 1958) (“A large part of the matter which
appears in newspapers and news magazines today is not published or read for the value or
importance of the information it conveys. Some readers are attracted by shocking news.
Others are titillated by sex in the news.”).
138. Gautier v. Pro-Football, Inc., 278 A.D. 431, 435 (N.Y. App. Div. 1951).
139. Goelet v. Confidential, Inc., 5 A.D.2d 226, 229 (N.Y. App. Div. 1958).
140. Themo v. New Eng. Newspaper Publ’g Co., 27 N.E.2d 753, 754 (Mass. 1940).
141. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D cmt. g (1977).
142. Huggins v. Moore, 94 N.Y.2d 296, 303 (1999) (citation omitted). See also Ross v.
Midwest Commc’ns Inc., 870 F.2d 271, 275 (5th Cir. 1989) (stating that “judges, acting with
the benefit of hindsight, must resist the temptation to edit journalists aggressively”);
Shulman, 74 Cal. Rptr. 2d 862 (stating that “[t]he courts do not, and constitutionally could
not, sit as superior editors of the press”); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D
cmt. g (1977) (“To a considerable extent, in accordance with the mores of the community,
the publishers and broadcasters have themselves defined the term [news], as a glance at
any morning paper will confirm.”). But see Amy Gajda, Judging Journalism: The Turn
Toward Privacy and Judicial Regulation of the Press, 97 CAL. L. REV. 1039, 1042–43 (2009)
(arguing that courts are increasingly determining newsworthiness in privacy cases based
on whether the news organization complied with professional ethics codes).
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unclad in one of her films is a matter of great interest to many
people. . . . [I]t is not for the courts to decide what matters are
143
of interest to the general public.
Nude photos of an actress would have zero chance of satisfying
Britain’s public-interest standard. In 1982, a case before the New
York Court of Appeals involved a photo taken of an African144
American man named Clarence W. Arrington without his consent.
This photo was used as the cover of The New York Times Magazine
145
to illustrate an article on “The Black Middle Class: Making It.” The
article said that the black middle class “has been growing more
removed from its less fortunate brethren,” an elitist attitude not held
146
by the subject of the photo. Arrington sued and although the court
acknowledged that “others quite reasonably took the article’s ideas to
147
be ones he shared,” he lost. In the court’s evaluation, the article fell
within the scope of the “freely defined” public interest, and the photo
148
was related to the topic. Arrington’s humiliation was “part of the
price every person must be prepared to pay for a society in which
149
Under such precedents as
information and opinion flow freely.”
Von Hannover and Campbell, Arrington would easily have won in
Britain.
Moreover, whereas Britain requires the defendant to demonstrate
that the revelation was in the public interest, American courts place
the burden on the plaintiff to demonstrate that the revelation was not
150
of legitimate public concern. According to one commentator, this
obligation to prove a negative “puts the plaintiff at a tremendous
151
disadvantage.” But, as one California appellate court explained, a
contrary approach—the approach taken by Britain—would “read the

143. Ann-Margret v. High Society Magazine, 498 F. Supp. 401, 405 (S.D.N.Y. 1980)
(citations omitted).
144. Arrington v. N.Y. Times Co., 434 N.E.2d 1319 (N.Y. 1982).
145. Id. at 1320.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 1322.
149. Id. But cf. M.G. v. Time Warner, Inc., 107 Cal. Rptr. 2d 504, 515 (Ct. App. 2001)
(finding Sports Illustrated potentially liable for publishing a photograph of a Little League
team in which some of the children had been sexually abused by their coach).
150. See Ross v. Midwest Commc’ns, 870 F.2d 271, 273 (5th Cir. 1989); Shulman v.
Group W. Prods., 74 Cal. Rptr. 2d 843, 852 (Cal. 1998).
151. Geoff Dendy, Note, The Newsworthiness Defense to the Public Disclosure Tort, 85
KY. L.J. 147, 148 n.6 (1997).
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rights of free speech and press out of the Constitution.” The First
Amendment thus requires that the burden fall on the plaintiff,
contrary to the plaintiff-friendly British rule.
In addition, the American tort for publication of private facts is
reasonably clear. It is “one of the more commonly litigated and well153
defined areas of privacy law.” On the other hand, British privacy
law, as noted, is murky. This uncertainty magnifies the chilling effect.
Finally, the presumption against prior restraints makes it virtually
inconceivable that an American judge would enjoin publication of
154
material to prevent an invasion of privacy.
The standard for
restraining speech before publication can be gauged by famous dicta
in Near v. Minnesota: “No one would question but that a government
might prevent . . . the publication of the sailing dates of transports or
155
In a 1979 case, a federal
the number and location of troops.”
district court ordered the magazine, The Progressive, not to publish
an article that purported to reveal the secrets of the hydrogen
156
bomb. “A mistake in ruling against The Progressive will seriously
infringe cherished First Amendment rights,” the judge held—but “[a]
mistake in ruling against the United States could pave the way for
157
It is difficult to envision how the
thermonuclear annihilation.”
harms resulting from even the most egregious invasion of privacy
could reach the level of ambushed troops, much less thermonuclear
annihilation, so as to justify an injunction.
Thus, as with libel, privacy law favors plaintiffs in Britain and
defendants in the United States. First, an American plaintiff must
prove that the revelation would be highly offensive, objectively
defined, whereas a British plaintiff must show merely that it falls
within a reasonable expectation of privacy, subjectively defined.
Second, an American plaintiff must demonstrate that the revelation is
not of legitimate interest to the public or newsworthy, broadly
defined, whereas a British defendant must show that the information
advances a narrowly defined public interest. Third, clarity lessens the
chilling effect of privacy law in the United States; British privacy law
is anything but clear. Finally, injunctions to prevent unlawful

152. Diaz v. Oakland Tribune, Inc., 188 Cal Rptr. 762, 770 (Ct. App. 1983).
153. Shulman, 74 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 852.
154. Cf. Org. for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 420 (1971) (ordering an
injunction vacated in a privacy case).
155. Near v. Minn., 283 U.S. 697, 716 (1931).
156. United States v. Progressive Inc., 467 F. Supp. 990 (W.D. Wisc. 1979).
157. Id. at 996.
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invasions of privacy are almost unthinkable in the United States but
commonplace in Britain.

IV. Counterarguments
One might argue that extending the SPEECH Act to cover
privacy is unnecessary or at least premature on five grounds.
First, even without extending the SPEECH Act, an American
court might refuse to enforce a British privacy judgment as contrary
to public policy. That is what happened in Matusevitch v. Telnikoff
and Bachchan v. India Abroad Publishers, where courts refused to
enforce British libel judgments as repugnant to the public policy
158
Indeed, the Congressional
embodied in the First Amendment.
Research Service was unable to cite a single case in which an
159
American court had enforced a British libel judgment. But even if a
libel or privacy judgment cannot be enforced, its existence may blot
the record of an author, perhaps hampering applications for jobs or
160
loans. Travel may also be constrained. Ehrenfeld told the House
Judiciary Committee that the Mahfouz judgment was preventing her
from visiting Britain or other European countries that reciprocally
161
British judgments can be enforced
enforce British judgments.
162
In the realm of
across the European Union except for Denmark.
libel, moreover, the mere possibility that British law might stretch

158. Matusevitch v. Telnikoff, 877 F. Supp. 1, 4 (D.D.C. 1995), aff’d, 159 F.3d 636
(D.C. Cir. 1998); Telnikoff v. Matusevitch, 702 A.2d 230, 238 (Md. 1997); Bachchan v.
India Abroad Pubs., 585 N.Y.S.2d 661, 665 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1992); H.R. REP. NO. 111–154,
at 4–5 (2009), available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname
=111_cong_reports&docid=f:hr154.111.pdf. Linda J. Silberman of New York University
School of Law criticized the Matusevitch holding before the House Judiciary Committee.
See Libel Tourism, supra note 2, at 60, 72 (statement of Linda J. Silberman, Davis Write
Tremaine, LLP). See also Sarl Louis Feraud Int’l v. Viewfinder Inc., 489 F.3d 474, 480 (2d
Cir. 2007) (declining to enforce French judgment in a copyright case that impinged on
First Amendment rights); Michelle A. Wyant, Confronting the Limits of the First
Amendment: A Proactive Approach for Media Defendants Facing Liability Abroad, 9 SAN
DIEGO INT’L L. J. 367, 410 (2008).
159. HENNING & CHU, supra note 46, at 8.
160. See S. REP. NO. 111-224, at 2 (2010); BELL, supra note 13, at 170 ¶ 4.80; Sullivan,
supra note 16, at 30.
161. See Libel Tourism, supra note 2, at 12 (statement of Rachel Ehrenfeld).
Mahfouz’s lawyer responded that Ehrenfeld had nothing to fear unless she planned to
bring a great deal of money with her: “We abolished debtors’ prisons some time ago.” Writ
Large, ECONOMIST, Jan. 8, 2009, reprinted in Libel Tourism, supra note 2, at 32–33
(statement of Bruce D. Brown).
162. See Libel Tourism, supra note 2, at 136 (response by Bruce D. Brown to posthearing questions).
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across the Atlantic created a chilling effect on American publishers.
At a hearing on what became the SPEECH Act, one attorney
testified that “[v]irtually every demand letter we receive these days
164
from a U.S. lawyer is accompanied by one from a British solicitor.”
The resulting self-censorship, according to the House Judiciary
165
Committee, “threatens First Amendment rights.”
Now, the same
thing is happening with privacy law. London media attorney Mark
Stephens told The Economist that he knew of seven instances in a
single month in which British lawyers representing American citizens
166
had threatened to file privacy suits against American media outlets.
Second, perhaps the SPEECH Act already reaches privacy torts.
The statute covers attempts to enforce defamation judgments and
defines defamation as “any action or other proceeding for
defamation, libel, slander, or similar claim alleging that forms of
speech are false, have caused damage to reputation or emotional
distress, have presented any person in a false light, or have resulted in
167
criticism, dishonor, or condemnation of any person.”
One could
argue that invasion of privacy represents a “similar claim alleging that
forms of speech . . . have caused . . . emotional distress,” especially
168
But that
given the mention of another privacy tort, false light.
argument might be a stretch; in any event, the uncertainty of its
success until litigated leaves the chilling effect intact. Clarity—merely
adding the word “privacy” to the list of causes of action—would
reduce the chilling effect.
Third, the doctrine of comity argues for American courts to
169
enforce foreign judgments wherever possible. Maintaining friendly
relations with other countries requires granting their laws maximal
170
respect. But comity has its limits.
Some countries, for example,
refuse to enforce American antitrust judgments, which are said to

163. H.R. REP. NO. 111-154, at 4 (2009).
164. Id. (quoting testimony of Laura R. Handman),
165. Id.
166. Writ Large, supra note 148, at 33.
167. 28 U.S.C. § 4101(1) (2010).
168. For this point, I am indebted to Michael W. Macleod-Ball, Chief of Staff and First
Amendment Counsel, ACLU Washington Legislative Office.
169. See Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 202–03 (1859). Many states have adopted the
Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act of 1962 or the Uniform ForeignCountry Money Judgments Recognition Act of 2005, which incorporates principles from
Hilton. See HENNING & CHU, supra note 46, at 7–8.
170. See Kaepa, Inc. v. Achilles Corp., 76 F.3d 624, 627 (5th Cir. 1996) (“We decline ...
to require a district court to genuflect before a vague and omnipotent notion of comity
every time that it must decide whether to enjoin a foreign action.”).
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171

favor plaintiffs.
Moreover, the exercise of extravagant
jurisdiction—as Britain does with libel and threatens to do with
privacy—also menaces international relations and invites
172
In addition, concerns about comity contributed to
retaliation.
Congress’s decision to adopt the SPEECH Act over the more farreaching bills that provided for countersuits, jurisdiction over foreign
173
defendants, and treble damages. However, these concerns did not
prevent the passage of the SPEECH Act itself.
Fourth, British privacy law may be on the verge of change.
174
Editors have denounced the privacy rulings, a justice minister has
175
talked of introducing reform legislation in Parliament, a judicial
176
committee is examining the use of injunctions in privacy cases, and
although Justice Eady remains a judge, he has not been reappointed
177
as senior judge in charge of libel and privacy cases. However, these
“reforms” may further constrict speech. Max Mosley, for example,
has petitioned the Strasbourg court to require a news outlet planning
a potentially invasive article to notify the subject of the article before
publication, so that he or she can seek an injunction. Mosley also
178
Noting the
wants privacy trials to be held behind closed doors.
convergence of print and online media, one witness before the
Parliamentary committee called for the regulation of British
newspapers by Ofcom, the agency that regulates broadcast and

171. See BARBOUR, supra note 9, at 13 & nn. 92–93.
172. See Petrossian, supra note 16, at 1276–77.
173. See H.R. REP. NO. 111-154, at 6 (2009); BARBOUR, supra note 9, at 10; Libel
Tourism, supra note 2, at 60, 69–70 (statement of Linda J. Silberman).
174. See Paul Dacre, Society of Editors: Paul Dacre’s Speech in Full, PRESS GAZETTE,
Nov. 9, 2008, available at http://www.pressgazette.co.uk/story.asp? storycode=42394.
175. Christopher Hope, Privacy Law to Stop Rise in Gagging Orders by Judges,
TELEGRAPH, Aug. 17, 2010, available at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/lawand-order/7949432/Privacy-law-to-stop-rise-in-gagging-orders-by-judges.html.
176. See Press Release, Judiciary of England and Wales, Committee to Examine
“Super-Injunctions” (Apr. 6, 2010), available at http://www.judiciary.gov.uk/media/mediareleases/2010/1510.
177. See Press Release, Judiciary of England and Wales, Appointment of New Judge
in Charge of the Queen’s Bench Jury and Non-Jury Lists (Sept. 13, 2010), available at
http://www.judiciary.gov.uk/media/media-releases/2010/news-release-2510; Judge Behind
“Backdoor Privacy Law” and Footballer Super-Injunctions to Step Down, DAILY MAIL,
Sept. 15, 2010, available at http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1312114/Mr-JusticeEady-Judge-backdoor-privacy-law-step-down.html.
178. See Press Standards, Privacy, and Libel Vol. 1, supra note 21, at 28–29 ¶¶ 77, 80–
81; Press Standards, Privacy, and Libel Vol. 2, supra note 7, at 57 (testimony of Max
Mosley); Gavin Phillipson, Max Mosley Goes to Strasbourg: Article 8, Claimant
Notification and Interim Injunctions, 1 J. OF MEDIA L. 73, 81–82 (2009).
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179

telecommunications.
Further, reforms of libel law are also under
consideration in Britain, as the House Judiciary Committee
acknowledged in its report, but they did not prevent or postpone
180
passage of the SPEECH Act. As attorney Bruce D. Brown told the
Senate Judiciary Committee, “[W]e need not wait for the glacial pace
of reform abroad to bear fruit in order to take steps in Congress
181
today to protect our own free speech traditions.”
Fifth, one might argue that privacy tourism does not yet represent
a problem. American courts have apparently not yet enforced a
foreign privacy judgment inconsistent with the First Amendment, and
they have not even been asked to do so. Indeed, it appears that no
litigant has sued an American media outlet in Britain for invasion of
privacy.
But a similar argument was raised concerning libel
182
tourism. In Britain, both Lord Hoffmann and Justice Eady were
183
outspoken in denying that libel tourism represented any problem.
The House of Representatives report on the SPEECH Act referred
to the number of libel tourist lawsuits as “admittedly small” and said
that enforcement of a foreign judgment contrary to First Amendment
184
Nonetheless,
standards was merely a “disturbing possibility.”
Congress acted. With privacy, as with libel, lawsuits need not be tried
185
or even filed, but merely threatened.
As media lawyer Kurt
Wimmer told the Senate Judiciary Committee during a hearing on
libel tourism, “[t]he impact of the sword of Damocles is not that it
186
falls, but that it hangs.”

V. Conclusion
In their renowned article in 1890, Samuel D. Warren and Louis D.
Brandeis advocated a tort to protect individuals against a “press [that]
is overstepping in every direction the obvious bounds of propriety
187
They envisioned a far-reaching cause of action,
and of decency.”

179. Press Standards, Privacy, and Libel Vol. 2, supra note 7, at 47 (testimony of
Jonathan Coad, Swan Turton Solicitors).
180. See H.R. REP. NO. 111-154, at 6–7; SMOLLA, supra note 21, at § 1:9.50.
181. Brown 2010 Testimony, supra note 48.
182. See John J. Walsh, The Myth of “Libel Tourism,” N.Y. L. J., Nov. 20, 2007,
available at http://www.clm.com/publication.cfm/ID/177.
183. See Lord Hoffmann, supra note 24; Eady, supra note 76, at 8–9.
184. H.R. REP. NO. 111-154, at 4, 5.
185. Id.
186. Wimmer Testimony, supra note 18.
187. Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV.
193, 196 (1890).
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one that would punish “the unauthorized circulation of portraits of
private persons” as well as the publication of details of “the private
life, habits, acts, and relations of an individual” unless they bear on
188
his or her fitness for public office. Along with monetary damages,
the authors recommended the availability of injunctive relief “in
189
perhaps a very limited class of cases.” American law, however, has
190
developed in a different direction. The First Amendment protects
the publication of material that would likely affront Warren’s and
191
Brandeis’s sensibilities.
Indeed, in a leading privacy case, the
Second Circuit acknowledged that it was authorizing the publication
of material that Warren and Brandeis believed “all men alike are
192
Contrast that with the
entitled to keep from public curiosity.”
evaluation of one commentator about today’s privacy law in Britain:
193
it “protects more than Warren and Brandeis ever contemplated.”
Expanding the SPEECH Act is not a perfect solution. Larger
American media organizations have assets in Europe, so in many
instances, privacy plaintiffs need not try to enforce judgments in the
United States at all—they can do so overseas, free of the constraints
194
Nonetheless, adding “privacy” to the
of the First Amendment.
SPEECH Act would help reduce the chilling effect on American
publishers and preempt a threat to First Amendment values.
“[P]rivacy is the new libel,” Private Eye editor Hislop told the
195
Parliamentary committee. Before privacy tourism becomes the new
libel tourism, Congress should extend the SPEECH Act to judgments
for invasion of privacy.

188. Id. at 195, 216.
189. Id. at 219.
190. See Richard A. Posner, The Right of Privacy, 12 GA. L. REV. 393, 409 (1978).
191. See, e.g., Ann-Margret v. High Society Magazine, 498 F. Supp. 401, 405 (S.D.N.Y.
1980).
192. Sidis v. F-R Pub. Corp., 113 F.2d 806, 809 (2d Cir. 1940).
193. John Francis Curry, Fame and Privacy: Mutually Exclusive? A Comparative
Analysis, 5 U. C. DUBLIN L. REV. 155, 171 (2005).
194. Cf. S. REP. NO. 111-224, at 10 (2010) (additional views of Sen. Kyl) (noting as a
shortcoming of the SPEECH Act the possibility that British libel judgments would be
enforced against Americans’ European assets); Libel Tourism, supra note 2, at 57
(statement of Laura R. Handman).
195. Press Standards, Privacy, and Libel Vol. 2, supra note 7, at 191 (testimony of Ian
Hislop). See also Sullivan, supra note 18, at 22 (stating that “[s]ome lawyers in the United
Kingdom fear that privacy issues will become the next libel tourism”).
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